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ExECUTIvE SUMMARy
This paper assesses economic policy coordination
in the euro area under the European Semester. In
sections 2 and 3, we make a positive (and not
normative) assessment by taking Council recom-
mendations made in the context of the European
Semester as given and evaluating their imple-
mentation and consistency, without assessing
their desirability. Section 4, which assesses
options to improve compliance with the recom-
mendations, is by definition more subjective.
The key conclusion of section 2, which analyses
the implementation of European Semester
recommendations in comparison with OECD Going
for Growth recommendations, is that the European
Semester is not effective:
Implementation of recommendations given•
under the European Semester was modest
(40 percent in the EU according to our indica-
tor) at its inception in 2011. In spite of the
efforts made to improve the European
Semester in recent years  the implementation
index steadily fell to 29 percent by 2014.
Euro-area countries, for which policy coordi-•
nation should be stronger in principle,
implemented their recommendations only
somewhat more than non-euro area countries
(31 percent versus 23 percent for the 2014
recommendations), while the implementa-
tion rate fell steadily in both country groups
from 2011-14. 
The rate of implementation of recommenda-•
tions related to the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) is typically higher (44 percent on
average in 2012-14) than the implementation
of recommendations related to the Macro-
economic Imbalance Procedure (32 percent
in 2012-14) and other recommendations (29
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percent in 2012-14). Even though SGP
recommendations have the strongest legal
basis, the average 44 percent implementa-
tion rate cannot be regarded as large, while
the EIP implementation rate is even lower,
suggesting that the European Semester is not
particularly effective in enforcing the EU’s
fiscal and macroeconomic imbalance rules.
Despite huge efforts by European institutions•
to coordinate economic policies within the
European Semester, the rate of implementa-
tion of these recommendations is not higher
than the rate of implementation of the OECD’s
unilateral recommendations. Overlaps
between the European Semester and OECD
recommendations only partly explain this
similarity.
OECD reform responsiveness rates were prac-•
tically the same in 2013-14 and in 2007-08,
suggesting that reform efforts have not
increased compared to the pre-crisis period.
Countries tend to undertake more reforms•
when they are under a financial assistance
programme, experience market pressure or
face high unemployment. Yet even in those
countries, reform momentum fades once the
situation normalises.
Section 3 takes the 2015 recommendations for
the euro area as given and assesses their
consistency with the country-specific recom-
mendations (CSRs) to the five largest member
states. Our general conclusion is that the 2015
euro-area recommendations with tangible
economic goals are not well reflected in the
recommendations issued to member states (with
the exception of reforming services markets):
On the 2015 euro-area recommendations with•
tangible economic goals, we conclude that: 
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The reference to the euro-area aggregate•
fiscal stance is not much more than
empty rhetoric. How the optimal aggre-
gate fiscal stance should be determined
is not defined. The Council recommends
that the aggregate fiscal stance should
be in line with sustainability risks and
cyclical conditions, but it does not even
state what this aggregate stance is. There
is no top-down approach to determine
national fiscal stances that correspond
with the optimal aggregate, and it is
therefore accidental if the sum of coun-
try-specific fiscal stances corresponds
with the optimal aggregate fiscal stance. 
Fostering investment is a key goal men-•
tioned in two euro-area recommenda-
tions, but CSRs to the five largest
euro-area countries are not consistent
with this goal.
The euro-area recommendation to cor-•
rect excessive internal and external debt
is not well reflected in the CSRs to the five
largest euro-area countries despite the
fact that the Alert Mechanism Report of
2015, which was published before the
CSRs, identifies this as an excessive
imbalance in Italy, the Netherlands and
Spain.
The euro-area recommendation to•
reduce the high tax wedges on labour is
not well reflected in the CSRs to the five
largest euro-area countries despite the
highlighted importance of this issue in
the preamble of the Council recommen-
dation for the euro area.
Reform of services markets: this euro-•
area recommendation is well reflected in
the CSRs of the five largest euro-area
countries. Each country, except for the
Netherlands, received a recommenda-
tion to reform its services sector.
While a recommendation on the need for sym-•
metric intra-euro adjustment was made for
the euro area in 2012, 2013 and 2014, it was
not included in the 2015 recommendations.
The key conclusions of section 4, which reviews
various proposals to improve the efficiency of the
European Semester, are that while certain steps
could be helpful, policy coordination will likely still
have major limitations in the future:
The proposal to split the European Semester•
into two stages, with only euro-area issues
discussed in the first stage and country-spe-
cific issues reflecting the euro-area conclu-
sions in the second stage, is welcome.
However, in the absence of a euro-area instru-
ment for stabilising economic cycles or a
mechanism to force counties to run larger
budget deficits, the optimal aggregate fiscal
stance will not be achieved by anything other
than pure chance.
The establishment of an independent advi-•
sory European Fiscal Board is welcome. It
could increase transparency and foster the
debate about fiscal policies in the euro area.
It should be entrusted with the definition of
an unconstrained optimal aggregate fiscal
stance (ie the fiscal stance disregarding SGP
rules) and its constrained version, which con-
siders the SGP rules for the euro area as a
whole and for each member state. It should
also define the available fiscal space.
Decentralisation efforts, such as the estab-•
lishment of national competitiveness author-
ities and greater involvement of national
governments, parliaments and social part-
ners in discussions and decisions on the
reform process, are welcome. These meas-
ures would likely increase domestic owner-
ship of the reform process, which would be a
great improvement, though we are sceptical
about whether cross-country spillover effects
will be better internalised.
Formalising the convergence process might•
help the reform process, but we see major dif-
ficulties in the definition of benchmarks, in
making them binding and in political enforce-
ment, should a country not comply.
Financial incentives for the reform process,•
such as grants in exchange for reforms or a
reallocation of EU investments to countries
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complying with European Semester recom-
mendations, risk limiting the domestic own-
ership of reforms, would be unfair to countries
that have already implemented reforms and
are unlikely to influence those countries that
have sound fiscal positions.
Ex-post monitoring of reform implementation•
by an independent EU-level ‘structural coun-
cil’ would be worth consideration, not least
because it could improve transparency and
could highlight the steps the European Com-
mission could take to improve the cross-
country consistency of CSRs.
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Semester is a yearly cycle of eco-
nomic policy coordination within the European
Union. It is supposed to improve economic policy
coordination within the union and ensure the
implementation of the EU’s economic rules (such
as those in the Stability and Growth Pact – SGP –
and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure –
MIP). In autumn each year, the European Com-
mission sets out the EU priorities for the coming
year in the Annual Growth Survey and publishes
its opinions on each country’s draft budgetary
plan. After each country presents its Stability
(euro-area countries) or Convergence (non-euro
area countries) Programme and its National
Reform Programme (later, in the spring), which set
out their budgetary and economic policies,
respectively, the European Commission proposes
Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) for
budgetary and economic policies. The Council dis-
cusses these recommendations, amends them if
deemed appropriate and adopts them.
Recommendations made in the context of an
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and an Exces-
sive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) are binding. For
other recommendations, member states “shall
take due account of the guidance addressed to
them in the development of their economic,
employment and budgetary policies before taking
key decisions on their national budgets for the
succeeding years”1.  Non-compliance with rec-
ommendations can lead to warnings, further rec-
ommendations and enhanced monitoring, and in
the case of EDP and EIP requirements, non-com-
1. See Regulation (EU) No
1175/2011 of the
European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 November
2011 amending Council
Regulation (EC) No
1466/97 on the strength-
ening of the surveillance of
budgetary positions and
the surveillance and
coordination of economic
policies, which was part of
the so-called Six Pack
agreed by all European
Union Member States in
2011. We note that the
Excessive Imbalance
Procedure has not yet been
activated for any
EU country.
2. See sanctions under the
SGP at:
http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/economic_gov-
ernance/sgp/index_en.htm ,
and sanctions under
the MIP:
http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/economic_gov-
ernance/macroeconomic_i
mbalance_procedure/index_
en.htm.
pliance can lead to even financial sanctions2.
The track record of implementation has been
rather weak. Therefore, various changes have
already been implemented to improve compliance
with recommendations, including the ‘Streamlined
European Semester’ from 2015, which aims to
achieve greater focus, and allows more discussion
time to discuss and more opportunities to engage
on substance with various stakeholders. Also, in
June 2015 the so-called Five Presidents’ Report
(Juncker, 2015) set out a plan for strengthening
the Economic and Monetary Union, and on 21
October 2015, the European Commission
published a first set of concrete proposals
(European Commission, 2015b). One of the pro-
posals is a revised approach to the European
Semester, with more focus on the situation of the
euro area as a whole in the first part of the Semes-
ter and a better reflection of this situation in the
discussion of each country’s situation and the
resulting CSRs. The proposed package of meas-
ures also includes the introduction of national
Competitiveness Boards and an advisory Euro-
pean Fiscal Board, more unified representation of
the euro area in international organisations, and
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Figure 1: European Semester reform
implementation index
Source: Bruegel. Note: we gave a score of 1 to
‘full/substantial progress’, a score of 0.5 to ‘some progress’
and a score of zero to ‘no/limited progress’: our indicator is
the ratio of the sum of the scores to the total number of
recommendations. Progress assessments are based on
European Parliament studies. We report an unweighted
average of those 21 EU countries for which data is available
for all years: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
The horizontal axis indicates the date of the European
Semester recommendations.
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steps towards a Financial Union, notably via a
European Deposit Insurance Scheme.
In this Policy Contribution, we first analyse the
track record of implementation of CSRs made in
2011-14 in comparison to the implementation of
the OECD’s Going for Growth recommendations. We
then evaluate the consistency between the 2015
euro-area recommendations and CSRs. Finally, we
discuss various proposals for improving the effec-
tiveness of the European Semester
2.  REFORM IMPLEMENTATION
2.1 Our European Semester reform implementa-
tion index 
IWe calculate a European Semester reform imple-
mentation index, which ranges between zero (no
BOx 1: CALCULATION OF A EUROPEAN SEMESTER REFORM IMPLEMENTATION INDEx
In order to assess the implementation of recommendations under the European Semester, we build on
the work by Deroose and Griesse (2014), and calculate a reform implementation index, which ranges
between zero (no or limited progress on all recommendations) and one (full implementation of, or
substantial progress on, all recommendations). The index is based on the qualitative assessment
included in various European Parliament reports, which in turn primarily depend on the European
Commission's own assessment, augmented (at least for 2011-12) with assessments from the IMF and
OECD when available. The assessment of the 2011 recommendations classified implementation into
three categories: “no implementation”, “partial implementation” and “full implementation”, while the
assessments of recommendations made in later years were classified into five categories: “fully imple-
mented”, ”substantial progress”, “some progress”, “limited progress” and “no progress”. Deroose and
Griesse (2014) create a synthetic indicator using the 5-scale assessment for 2012-13, by giving scores
of 1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25 and 0 to the five categories, respectively. In order to include the assessments of the
2011 recommendations, we use a 3-scale assessment and give a score of 1 to “fully implemented” and
“substantial progress”, a score of 0.5 to ”some progress” and a score of zero to “limited and no progress”:
our indicator is the ratio of the sum of the scores to the total number of recommendations. 
Certainly, there are some issues limiting the comparability of this index across time and across
countries, as highlighted by Deroose and Griesse (2014). Not all recommendations have the same
‘importance’ or ‘difficulty’. Countries might implement the ‘easier’ reforms first and postpone the more
difficult ones to later years. Implemented recommendations are not repeated in later years, but several
non-fully implemented reforms are recommended again. Therefore, the difficulty of recommendations
might increase over time. But very few recommendations have been fully implemented and partial
implementation of a recommendation in one year might be followed by the same recommendation
the next year, which would be easier to implement given the partial implementation of the previous
year's  recommendation. Also, most recommendations included several sub-recommendations. The qual-
itative assessment assessed each of these sub-recommendations one by one, so even ‘easy’
recommendations generally included a number of sub-components. The assessments of these
sub-recommendations form the basis of an overall assessment for the main recommendations.  There-
fore, while the issue of comparability across countries and time can be important and therefore results
should be assessed carefully, we believe that using a single index of reform implementation can provide
a useful summary indicator.
or limited progress on all recommendations) and
one (full implementation of, or substantial
progress on, all recommendations), as described
in Box 1. The index is primarily based on the
assessments of the European Commission. Figure
1 shows that the track record of implementation
of CSRs is modest and deteriorating. The average
value of our reform implementation index for the
21 EU countries for which recommendations were
made every year since 2011 was 40 percent. This
number does not mean that 40 percent of the
reforms were implemented in 2011; rather, it is an
indication of reform efforts. If “some progress”
would have been achieved on all recommenda-
tions, our indicator would have a value of 50 per-
cent. Since the aim of the recommendations is
their implementation, one would expect that some
recommendations are fully implemented, while
there was at least some progress with others, so a
3. On average, 6 recommen-
dations were made to each
country in 2014.
The following ten countries
implemented one recom-
mendation in full or
achieved substantial
progress: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Croatia, Lithuania,
Malta, Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovenia and
the United Kingdom. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICy COORDINATION IN THE EURO AREA UNDER THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER 
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
06
countries in the past three years, but the differ-
ence is small and the downward trend is visible in
both country groups.
2.2 The Stability and Growth Pact and
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
implementation 
We also check the implementation rates for the
two main procedures included in the European
Semester: the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP),
in comparison to recommendations that are not
related to either of these procedures. Again, our
indicators are based on the European Commis-
sion’s assessment.
Given that the SGP has strong legal enforcement
tools, one would expect a high implementation
rate for recommendations related to the SGP. There
are some enforcement tools for the MIP under the
Excessive Imbalance Procedure, but this proce-
dure has not been so far activated for any coun-
try. The MIP has six phases ranging from ‘No
imbalances’ to ‘Excessive imbalances, which
require decisive policy action and the activation
of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure’. Recom-
mendations are more binding when the Excessive
Imbalance Procedure is activated. Table 1 shows
the 2015 status of the MIP.
Figure 2 shows that the implementation rate of
recommendations related to the SGP tends to be
higher than that for the MIP and other recommen-
dations. The difference was particularly large for
score well above 50 percent would be appropriate.
We therefore assess that the 40 percent score is
modest at best. Yet instead of improved imple-
mentation in later years as the European Semes-
ter matured, the implementation index fell
steadily to 29 percent in 2014. In 2014, out of the
157 main recommendations issued to European
countries, only 10 were fully implemented or
showed substantial progress3. There was some
progress on 70 main recommendations, while
there was no or limited progress on 77 main rec-
ommendations. Implementation was slightly
higher in euro-area countries than in non-euro
0.00
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0.75
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2012 2013 2014
SGP MIP Neither
Figure 2: European Semester implementation
rates according to the type of recommendations
Source: Bruegel using European Commission and European
Parliament data. Note: see the notes to Figure 1 for the
method of calculating our index. Averages for the
recommendations made for 21 countries are reported
(programme countries and Croatia, which joined the EU in
2014, are not included). Some recommendations are related
for both the SGP and MIP, which are taken into account for
both procedures.
Table 1: Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, status per member state in 2015
MIP Category Member states* 
No imbalances
Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Latvia, Malta, Poland and Slovakia
Imbalances, which require policy action and monitoring
Belgium, Netherlands, Romania**, Finland, Sweden, United
Kingdom
Imbalances, which require decisive policy action and moni-
toring
Hungary, Germany
Imbalances, which require decisive policy action and spe-
ciﬁc monitoring
Ireland, Spain, Slovenia
Excessive imbalances, which require decisive policy action
and speciﬁc monitoring
Bulgaria, France, Croatia, Italy, Portugal
Excessive imbalances, which require decisive policy action
and the activation of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure
Source: Box 1 of European Commission (2015a).  Note: * Cyprus and Greece are in a macroeconomic adjustment programme. **
Romania is in a precautionary ﬁnancial assistance programme.
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European Semester. Moreover, the OECD’s reform
responsiveness rate was practically the same in
2013-14 (30 percent) as in 2007-08 (31 percent),
while it was somewhat higher in 2011-12 (42 per-
cent). The somewhat higher rate in 2011-12 could
be explained by increased efforts during the crisis,
but from 2007-08 to 2013-14 there was no
increase in reform implementation, notwithstand-
ing the new European economic governance
frameworks. 
The other panels of Figure 3 show the two indica-
tors (when available) for all EU countries except
Cyprus, and for the United States and Japan4. The
similarity we highlighted holds for almost every
EU country.
Figure 3 highlights that the countries under a
financial assistance programme or undergoing
severe macroeconomic adjustments, implement
the most. The highest reform responsiveness rate,
92 percent, was observed in Greece in 2011-12
according to the OECD. In the same period, the
reform responsiveness rate was 82 percent for Ire-
land and 77 percent for Portugal. Estonia, a coun-
try undergoing severe macroeconomic
adjustment, had a high score too (80 percent).
Next in the ranking is Spain with a reform respon-
siveness rate of 70 percent. The only other occa-
sion with a similarly high reform responsiveness
rate was for Hungary in 2007-08 (73 percent),
when Hungary had already started a major fiscal
and macroeconomic adjustment process. In all
of these countries, the reform responsiveness
rate fell in the next time period (though it typically
remained above the EU average), when either
the financial assistance programme ended
(Ireland and Portugal), or market pressure eased
(Hungary and Spain), or when reform fatigue set
in while continuing the financial assistance pro-
gramme (Greece). 
For those countries not under a financial assis-
tance programme, or not undergoing severe
macroeconomic adjustment, the reform imple-
mentation index remained very low, a result which
also holds for the United States and Japan5. This
suggests that implementation of reforms sug-
gested by international organisations is generally
low and that the European Semester was not able
to improve this situation. 
the 2013 recommendations, but narrowed by
2014. The average SGP implementation rate in
2012-14 was 44 percent, which is not particularly
high and suggests that the European Semester is
not particularly effective in enforcing the EU’s
fiscal rules. 
2.3 European Semester vs OECD
recommendations
We would like to assess whether reform imple-
mentation has increased compared to the pre-
crisis period (ie whether the European Semester
had a positive impact on reform implementation),
including reform implementation in countries
under a financial assistance programme, which
are not included in the regular European Semes-
ter recommendations and are also exempt from
the obligation to submit medium-term budgetary
plans or reform programmes. Therefore, we
include in our analysis the implementation of the
OECD’s Going for Growth recommendations, which
are available for a longer time period for OECD
member states, including countries which are
under a financial assistance programme. The
OECD recommendations are not part of any cross-
country surveillance process and therefore there
is no mechanism to coordinate these reforms
across countries or to enforce them. The OECD cal-
culates an indicator called ‘Overall reform respon-
siveness rates’, which is based on OECD staff
assessment. This responsiveness indicator is cal-
culated for two-year periods; for comparability, we
also calculate our European Semester reform
implementation index over the same periods. 
The results are reported in Figure 3. The top-left
panel (for 16 EU countries) shows a striking result:
the two indicators are practically the same for
those countries for which both European Semes-
ter and OECD recommendations were available in
2011-14. One reason for the similar values of the
two indices is that there is some overlap between
the European Semester and OECD recommenda-
tions (see Annex 1). However, the overlap is far
from being perfect and therefore the similar imple-
mentation rates highlight the ineffectiveness of
the European Semester: its implementation is not
better than the OECD’s unilateral recommenda-
tions, despite the huge efforts by European insti-
tutions to coordinate economic policies within the
4. Cyprus entered a financial
assistance programme in
2012 and therefore
European Semester
recommendations were
made only in the first 2011
round, for which the reform
implementation rate was 27
percent. Moreover, Cyprus is
not included in the OECD
Going for Growth studies. 
5. By studying the OECD
reform responsiveness rate,
the regression analysis by
Terzi (2015a) suggests that
an IMF programme, a high
unemployment rate and
financial market stress
all tend to increase
reform efforts.
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Figure 3: Reform implementation: comparison of European Semester and OECD Going for Growth
recommendations
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6. Annex 2 gives the full text
of the recommendations.
3.  THE 2015 EURO-AREA RECOMMENDATIONS
On 14 July 2015, the European Council adopted
four recommendations for the euro area6:
“Use peer pressure to promote structural1
reforms that facilitate the correction of large
external and internal debts and support
investment.” The specific elements men-
tioned are monitoring and assessing reforms
by member states only in those countries
that are under the MIP; regular thematic
assessment of structural reforms; a coordi-
nation exercise to reduce the tax wedge on
labour and to reform services markets.
“Coordinate fiscal policies to ensure that the2
aggregate euro-area fiscal stance is in line
with sustainability risks and cyclical condi-
tions.” The specific elements emphasise the
supremacy of Stability and Growth Pact rules;
the need for thematic discussions on
improvements in the quality and sustainabil-
ity of public finances; and monitoring the
functioning of national fiscal frameworks.
Completing the EU’s financial unions: banking3
union (follow up to the ECB’s Comprehensive
Assessment; implementation of the Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive; ratifica-
tion of the Single Resolution Fund agreement)
and capital markets union (“Promote meas-
ures to deepen market-based finance, to
improve access to finance for SMEs and
develop alternative sources of finance.”).
Further reforms of national insolvency frame-
works are also encouraged. 
“Take forward work on deepening Economic4
and Monetary Union…”, a recommendation
that includes a reference to the Five
Presidents’ Report.
Since our goal is to assess policy coordination
under the European Semester, we take these
recommendations as given and do not assess
their desirability, though we note that in general,
we agree with the aims of these headline recom-
mendations. We highlight that in 2015, no recom-
mendation has been made on the need for a
symmetric adjustment within the euro area, even
though such a recommendation was made in
2012, 2013 and 2014, and the preamble of the
2015 Council recommendation for the euro area
also recognises that “External rebalancing is
ongoing, but progress has been asymmetric and
elevated current account surpluses in a few
Member States persist”. 
Our assessment of the four recommendations
(and the lack of a recommendation for a more
symmetric adjustment) takes three factors into
account:
First, we briefly comment on whether the•
specifics listed in the euro-area recommen-
dations are sufficient to achieve the stated
goals.
Second, we assess the consistency between•
the euro-area recommendations and the
CSRs, by focusing on the five largest euro-
area countries.
Third, we discuss the missing aspect of the•
symmetric adjustment in the euro area.
3.1 The specifics of the 2015 euro-area recom-
mendations
The specific recommendations that underpin the
first two euro-area recommendations are unlikely
to be sufficient for achieving the stated goals. The
third and fourth euro-area recommendations are
more general and therefore such assessment
cannot be made.
As highlighted in the previous section, imple-1
mentation of European Semester recommen-
dations has been rather weak and even
declining from 2011-14. While it is important
to improve compliance, recommendation No.
1 made in 2015 does not seem to have had
any power to improve compliance. Peer
pressure did not work in the last four years
and it is unclear why it would work better this
year. Moreover, while “supporting investment”
is included in the first sentence of this
recommendation, no indication was given of
how this goal should be achieved, beyond
peer pressure.
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The reference to the aggregate fiscal stance2
is vague. We see two crucial problems: first,
nothing is said about how the optimal fiscal
stance should be determined, and second, no
indication is provided on what “coordination”
specifically means to achieve it. Certainly,
improving the quality and sustainability of
public finances and monitoring the function-
ing of national fiscal frameworks are impor-
tant, but they are not directly linked to the
aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area. 
The recommendation to complete Europe’s3
financial unions is welcome. We only high-
light that this recommendation does not fore-
see new initiatives, but primarily aims for the
ratification and implementation of previous
agreements. Unfortunately, there is no
reference to a common deposit insurance
facility, which has become an intensively dis-
cussed topic7.
Given that the Five Presidents’ Report was4
published shortly ahead of the July 2015
European Council meeting, a reference to this
report was a must. We generally find the
level of ambition of the Five Presidents’
Report weak, but a detailed assessment
of that report is beyond the scope of this
Policy Contribution.
3.2  Consistency of euro-area and country-spe-
cific recommendations
We classify the euro-area recommendations in
four categories:
Procedural recommendations, such as “use1
peer pressure” and “continue/hold thematic
assessment of structural reforms/thematic
discussions on improvements in the quality
and sustainability of public finances”;
Strategic thinking, such as “Take forward work2
on deepening Economic and Monetary
Union”;
Legal ratification and implementation of exist-3
ing agreements, such as the completion of
the ratification of the intergovernmental
agreement on the Single Resolution Fund and
the implementation of the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive;
Recommendations that aim to achieve4
certain tangible economic goals, such as
“promote structural reforms that facilitate•
the correction of large internal and external
debts”;
“support investment”;•
“coordinate fiscal policies to ensure that the•
aggregate euro area fiscal stance is in
line with sustainability risks and cyclical
conditions”;
“reducing the high tax wedge on labour”•
“reforming services markets”.•
Euro-area recommendations belonging to the first
two categories concern the Eurogroup and should
not be repeated in country-specific recommenda-
tions. Recommendations on the implementation
of existing laws should not be repeated in
country-specific recommendations either, while
ratification of agreements could be mentioned
where it has not yet been done (category 3). Our
focus therefore is on category 4 recommenda-
tions, which aim to achieve certain tangible
economic goals. We assess whether they are
sufficiently reflected in CSRs and whether the cur-
rent institutional framework, along with the
procedural recommendations in category 1, offers
a good prospect for their implementation.
None of the category 4 recommendations include
numerical targets, which complicates the assess-
ment of their consistency with CSRs, while next
year this feature will give the Commission much
freedom to assess compliance with these
recommendations. In our assessment we assume
that the aim is to achieve ‘significant’ progress
towards these economic goals and therefore we
assess whether CSRs, if implemented, would be
able to achieve ‘significant’ (as opposed to ‘mar-
ginal’) progress.
3.2.1 The aggregate fiscal stance
Over the past few years, the EU institutions have
started paying more attention to the aggregate
fiscal stance of the euro area. While the first 2011
European Semester did not include a recommen-
7. We note that the European
Commission is in favour of
developing a common
deposit insurance scheme,
as detailed in its 21 October
2015 communication
(European Commission,
2015b).
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dation on the aggregate fiscal stance, such a
recommendation has been made in all subse-
quent rounds of the Semester (Table 2). The word-
ing has been slightly different in different rounds,
but the main message has been essentially the
same as in 2015: “to coordinate fiscal policies to
ensure that the aggregate fiscal stance is in line
with sustainability risks and cyclical conditions”,
which should be differentiated across countries
and take into account the cyclical position and
public debt sustainability of each country, while
fiscal consolidation (where needed) should have
a growth-friendly composition.
European Central Bank president Mario Draghi also
emphasised the importance of the aggregate
fiscal stance in his Jackson Hole speech in 2014
(Draghi, 2014): “it may be useful to have a
discussion on the overall fiscal stance of the euro
area. Unlike in other major advanced economies,
our fiscal stance is not based on a single budget
voted for by a single parliament, but on the aggre-
gation of eighteen national budgets and the EU
budget. Stronger coordination among the
different national fiscal stances should in princi-
ple allow us to achieve a more growth-friendly
overall fiscal stance for the euro area”. 
However, notwithstanding the recognition by the
Council, the European Commission and President
Draghi of the importance of the aggregate fiscal
stance, we find that the reference to the aggregate
euro-area fiscal stance by the Council in euro-area
and country-specific recommendations is little
more than empty rhetoric. First, neither the Coun-
cil, nor the Commission defines how the optimal
fiscal stance should be determined. In addition,
the Council does not even state what aggregate
fiscal stance “is in line with sustainability risks
and cyclical conditions”. While the Commission
Staff Working Document on the euro area states
that the current neutral aggregate fiscal stance is
broadly appropriate and strikes a good balance
between fiscal sustainability and cyclical condi-
tions8, it is more a value judgement than the result
of rigorous analysis, and the Council has not
adopted this judgement.
Second, irrespective of the way the optimal fiscal
stance is defined, the approach to achieving a
desired aggregate fiscal stance is not top-down,
whereby the optimal aggregate stance is taken as
the starting point and national budgets are deter-
mined accordingly. Instead, the resulting
aggregate stance is just the sum of national
budgets and it is accidental if this sum is equal to
what is considered optimal. 
The preamble of the Council recommendation for
the euro area highlights that “coordination of fiscal
policies remains sub-optimal. A number of euro
area Member States still need to continue with
fiscal adjustment to bring down very high levels
of debt. Other countries have more room for
manoeuvre and could use it to encourage domes-
tic demand, with a particular emphasis on invest-
ment; this would support domestic growth and the
euro area as a whole”. It seems therefore that the
conclusion about sub-optimal coordination was
reached for two reasons: (1) countries with high
debt might have not carried out sufficient fiscal
consolidation to bring down public debt, and (2)
countries with more fiscal space might have not
seized the opportunity to encourage domestic
Table 2: Evolution of euro-area recommendations about the euro-area aggregate ﬁscal stance
year Recommendation
2011 The 2011 euro-area recommendations did not include any mention of the aggregate ﬁscal stance.
2012
“ensure a coherent aggregate ﬁscal stance in the euro area by pursuing ﬁscal consolidation as set out in
Council recommendations and decisions, in line with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, which account
for country-speciﬁc macro-ﬁnancial situation”
2013
“ensure that the Eurogroup monitors and coordinates ﬁscal policies of the euro area Member States and the
aggregate ﬁscal stance for the euro area as a whole to ensure a growth friendly and diﬀerentiated ﬁscal
policy”
2014
“coordinate ﬁscal policies of the euro area Member States, in close cooperation with the Commission, in par-
ticular when assessing draft budgetary plans to ensure a coherent and growth-friendly ﬁscal stance across
the euro area”
2015
“euro area Member States take action within the Eurogroup to coordinate ﬁscal policies to ensure that the
aggregate ﬁscal stance is in line with sustainability risks and cyclical conditions”
8. The Commission Staff
Working Document accom-
panying the 2015 euro area
states: “The aggregate fiscal
picture in the euro area has
improved considerably
since the crisis began and
the aggregate fiscal stance
is broadly neutral, which
could be considered as an
acceptable balance
between ensuring sustain-
ability and stabilising the
business cycle.”
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demand, with an emphasis on investment.
Despite this conclusion, the specific euro-area
recommendation on the aggregate fiscal stance
did not consider aspect (2) by referring to the use
of available fiscal space, and similar recommen-
dations were not reflected in the CSRs of those
countries that have “more room for manoeuvre”.
In particular, for Germany, the European
Commission recommendation of 13 May 2015
included a slight attempt at fostering a reduction
of the fiscal surplus9: 
“Further increase public investment in infrastruc-
ture, education and research, including by using
the available fiscal space.”
However, the recommendations approved by the
Council no longer included the reference to the
use of available fiscal space:
“Further increase public investment in infrastruc-
ture, education and research.”
Certainly, it is the legitimate right of the Council to
decide on a tighter fiscal stance than what is
proposed by the Commission, similar to the right
of a government to adopt a tighter fiscal policy
than what is suggested by its fiscal council. But
the removal of the reference to the use of the avail-
able fiscal space underlines that even though the
Council acknowledged that one of the two aspects
of sub-optimal fiscal policy coordination is that
countries with fiscal space do not encourage
domestic demand, no attempt is needed to
remedy this problem10 . 
Furthermore, we highlight that while the conclu-
sion about the desirability of the aggregate
neutral fiscal stance is included only in the Com-
mission Staff Working Document, but not in the
Council recommendations, the CSRs for the five
largest euro-area countries are not consistent with
this aggregate view. For France and Spain the fiscal
consolidation recommendation is in-line with the
on-going Excessive Deficit Procedure, while for
Italy it is in line with the preventive arm of the SGP.
Therefore, to achieve a neutral aggregate fiscal
stance, fiscal consolidation in three of the five
largest euro-area countries (France, Italy and
Spain) should have been compensated for by
fiscal expansion in other large countries, but
this was not recommended to Germany or
the Netherlands11.
3.2.2 Support investment
There is a lot of emphasis in various Commission
reports on the importance of increasing invest-
ment. The Commission Staff Working Document on
the euro area (which does not necessarily reflect
the view of the College of Commissioners)
presented a simulation result demonstrating the
importance of public investment12. The impor-
tance of investment is also highlighted in the pre-
amble of the Council recommendations (“a wide
investment gap has opened”) and is reflected by
its inclusion in two of the Council’s four euro-area
recommendations. Yet we conclude that this euro-
area goal is not well reflected in CSRs. 
For France, the fifth CSR includes a reference to
investment: “To promote investment, take action
to reduce the taxes on production and the corpo-
rate income statutory rate, while broadening the
tax base on consumption.”
For Germany, the first recommendation is: “Further
increase public investment in infrastructure, edu-
cation and research. To foster private investment,
take measures to improve the efficiency of the tax
system, in particular by reviewing the local trade
tax and corporate taxation and by modernising
the tax administration. Use the ongoing review to
improve the design of fiscal relations between the
federation, Länder and municipalities, particularly
with a view to ensuring adequate public invest-
ment at all levels of government.”
9. We call it a ‘slight attempt’,
because the Commission’s
proposal to the use of the
available fiscal space was
not well specified, as it did
not quantify by how much
the budget surplus of
Germany should be reduced.
10. We note that Germany
has already over-achieved
its Medium-Term Objective
by around 1 percentage
point of GDP, and plans to do
so for the next 3 years
at least. 
11. We note that the actual
aggregate fiscal stance of
the euro area may be even
expansionary in 2015, if
countries which are required
to consolidate do not to
comply with their recom-
mendations and if the large
inflow of refugees and
migrants into the EU neces-
sitates extra public spend-
ing. However, the role of this
Policy Contribution is not to
speculate about expected
outcomes, but to assess
the consistency of
recommendations.  
12. The simulation results
quoted in the Commission
Staff Working Document on
the Euro area indicate that a
temporary two-year
increase in government
investment of 1 percent of
GDP in countries with fiscal
space would have a
persistent positive effect on
growth not just in these
countries (where the
multiplier would be between
0.8-1), but also in the rest of
euro area countries, where
GDP would also be boosted
by between 0.2-0.3 percent.
‘The removal of the reference to the use of the available fiscal space underlines that even
though the Council acknowledged that one of the two aspects of sub-optimal fiscal policy
coordination is that countries with fiscal space do not encourage
domestic demand, no attempt is needed to remedy this problem.’
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For the Netherlands, the first recommendation is:
“Shift public expenditure towards supporting
investment in R&D and work on framework condi-
tions for improving private R&D expenditure in
order to counter the declining trend in public R&D
expenditure and increase the potential for
economic growth.”
For Italy and Spain, investment is not even men-
tioned in their CSRs.
We conclude that these CSRs are insufficient to
foster a reasonable increase in public and private
investment.
Public investment: As we noted above, the•
Commission’s proposal to use “the available
fiscal space” was deleted by the Council from
the German recommendation on public
investment. This implies that a public invest-
ment stimulus should not be expected, only a
change in the composition of public expendi-
tures in favour of investment, similarly to the
Netherlands. In our view, one should not
expect much from changing the composition
of public spending, certainly not the 1 percent
of GDP extra investment stimulus, the effects
of which were simulated in the Commission
Staff Working Document on the euro area, as
we noted above. France, Italy and Spain did
not receive recommendations to increase
public investment.
Private investment: France and Germany are•
recommended to make their tax systems
more efficient, which is certainly welcome,
but we do not expect a major private invest-
ment boom as a result. Italy, the Netherlands
and Spain were not recommended to boost
private investment.
Therefore, we conclude that while fostering invest-
ment is a top priority at the euro-area level, this
recommendation is not well reflected in the CSRs
of the five largest euro-area countries.
3.2.3 Facilitate the correction of large internal and
external debts
The first euro-area recommendation invites euro-
area countries to use peer pressure to promote
structural reforms that facilitate the correction of
large internal and external debts. 
The Commission itself, in the 2015 Alert Mecha-
nism Report13, identifies excessive imbalances
concerning private debt (in the Netherlands and
Spain) and public debt (in Italy and Spain).
However there are almost no recommendations to
address large private debt overhangs; only Italy is
recommended to “take measures to accelerate
the broad-based reduction of non-performing
loans”. 
Regarding public debt, if we accept the premise
that cutting deficits during a recession will
successfully reduce public debt, then the euro-
area recommendation to correct large public debts
is reflected in the cases of France and Spain,
which are invited to correct their excessive
deficits, and Italy, which is recommended to
comply with the rules of the preventive arm of the
SGP. Germany and the Netherlands do not have
large public debts and therefore lack of such a
reference is to be expected.
3.2.4 Reduce the high tax wedge on labour
The first euro-area recommendation includes a
sub-recommendation on reducing high tax
wedges on labour. The importance of this issue is
also mentioned in the preamble to the Council
recommendations. Box 2 of the European
Commission Staff Working Document accompa-
nying the euro-area recommendations presents
numbers on the tax wedge and identifies very high
tax burdens on labour in Germany, France, Spain
and Italy. However, only Germany received a
recommendation to “take measures to reduce
high labour taxes”. 
Moreover, the same Staff Working Document
admits that “shifts away from labour taxes to more
growth-friendly taxes such as consumption,
recurrent property and environmental have been
taking place but these reforms remain relatively
modest compared to the challenge”. If reforms
were modest, it is surprising that this issue, which
the Council agrees is important, has not appeared
in the CSRs to the four other countries.
We conclude that the recommendation to reduce
13. European Commission
(2014) Alert Mechanism
Report 2015, Brussels, 28
November, COM (2014)
904 final.
14
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICy COORDINATION IN THE EURO AREA UNDER THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER 
the high tax wedges on labour is not well reflected
in the CSRs to the five largest euro-area countries,
despite the apparent consensus about the impor-
tance of the issue.
3.2.5 Reform services markets
This recommendation is well reflected in the CSRs.
France, for example, is recommended to “Remove
the restrictions on access to and the exercise of
regulated professions, beyond the legal profes-
sions, in particular as regards the health profes-
sions as from 2015.” Germany is recommended
to ”take more ambitious measures to stimulate
competition in the services sector”. In its sixth rec-
ommendation to Italy, the Council invites it to
“adopt competition-enhancing measures in all
sectors covered by the competition law, and take
decisive action to remove remaining barriers”.
Finally, Spain is recommended to “adopt the
planned reform on professional services”. There is
no related recommendation for the Netherlands.
We conclude that this euro-area recommendation
is indeed well reflected in the CSRs of the five
largest euro-area countries. Each country, except
the Netherlands, received a recommendation to
reform its services sector in some way.
3.3  Lack of symmetric adjustment within the
euro area
In 2012, 2013 and 2014, the Council made
recommendations for more symmetric adjust-
ment within the euro area, but the recommenda-
tion has disappeared by 2015 (Table 3).
In 2012, the recommendation called for “an
orderly unwinding of intra-euro area macroeco-
nomic imbalances”: by definition, intra-euro
imbalances include both deficits and surpluses.
In 2013, the recommendation was even clearer by
explicitly mentioning current account surpluses:
“correction of external and internal imbalances”
was recommended, with a particular emphasis on
addressing “distortions to saving and investment
behaviour in Member States with both current
account deficits and surpluses”. In 2014 a
similarly clear and strong recommendation was
made: “Foster appropriate policies in countries
with large current account surpluses to contribute
to positive spillovers.” It is very surprising that
despite the importance of symmetric intra-euro
adjustment, which was also recognised by the
2015 Commission Staff Working Document on the
euro area, this recommendation has disappeared
from the 2015 recommendations for the euro
area. Relevant recommendations are not included
in CSRs either.
Table 3: Evolution of euro-area recommendations concerning symmetric intra-euro adjustment 
year Recommendation
2011
The 2011 euro-area recommendations did not include any mention of symmetric adjustment and intra-euro
area macroeconomic imbalances
2012
“Implement structural reforms, which also promote ﬂexible wage adjustments, and which – together with a
diﬀerentiated ﬁscal stance – would promote an orderly unwinding of intra-euro area macroeconomic imbal-
ances and thus growth and jobs. This would include action at national level which reﬂects the country-spe-
ciﬁc situation and takes account of the Council recommendations to individual euro area Member States.”
2013
“Promote further adjustment in the euro area, ensuring a correction of external and internal imbalances, inter
alia by following thoroughly the reforms that address distortions to saving and investment behaviour in
Member States with both current account deﬁcits and surpluses”
2014
“Promote and monitor, in close cooperation with the Commission, the implementation of structural reforms in
those areas most relevant for the smooth functioning of the euro area in order to foster growth and conver-
gence and adjustment of internal and external imbalances. Assess and stimulate progress in delivering on
reform commitments in euro area Member States experiencing excessive imbalances and in reform imple-
mentation in the euro area Member States with imbalances requiring decisive action, to limit negative
spillovers to the rest of the euro area. Foster appropriate policies in countries with large current account sur-
pluses to contribute to positive spillovers.”
2015
The 2015 euro-area recommendations did not include any mention of symmetric adjustment and intra-euro
area macroeconomic imbalances
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Indeed, the adjustments of current account bal-
ances were asymmetric: deficit countries
adjusted, but surpluses continued growing
(Figure 4). 
The disappearance of the call for symmetric
adjustment from the euro-area recommendations
is in contrast to the main conclusions included in
the Commission Staff Working Documents (which,
as we have already highlighted, might not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the College of Commis-
sioners). The preamble of the 2015 Council
recommendation agrees that "external rebalanc-
ing is ongoing, but progress has been asymmetric
and elevated current account surpluses in a few
Member States persist"14. 
As the Commission argues in its Staff Working
Document accompanying its 2015 CSRs to
Germany, Germany’s close links to the rest of the
euro area, especially through trade and financial
markets, mean that economic spillovers can be
potentially large. Therefore both Germany and the
rest of the euro area would benefit from higher
levels of investment in Germany and a reduction
in its current account surplus: the resulting higher
domestic demand in surplus countries “is the only
other way of closing the output gap of the euro
area as a whole”15, given the constraints on mon-
etary and fiscal policy. The IMF (2015a, 2015c)
drew the same conclusion. By estimating
panel-econometric models for the medium-term
determinants of current account balances, Darvas
(2015) concluded that European current account
surpluses became excessive during the past
twelve years, while they were in line with model
predictions in the preceding three decades. 
Consequently, the disappearance of the call for
symmetric adjustment from the euro-area recom-
mendations suggests that the Council disagrees
with the findings of Commission staff, IMF reports
and some academic research. 
We have to conclude that there has been no
improvement since 2013, when Darvas and
Vihriälä (2013) concluded that “A major drawback
is that the Council recommendations do not give
sufficient importance to symmetric intra-euro
area adjustments. Reference to the euro area’s
‘aggregate fiscal stance’ is empty rhetoric.
Insufficient attention is paid to demand manage-
ment. The most comprehensive recommenda-
tions are made on structural reforms.” 
4.  PROPOSALS FOR AN IMPROvED EUROPEAN
SEMESTER
Our key conclusions showing that implementation
of 2011-14 CSRs has been weak and has even
declined, and that there are major consistency
problems between the 2015 euro-area recommen-
dations and CSRs, are in sharp contrast to the self-
congratulation included in the Commission Staff
Working Document on the euro area16. Efforts to
improve the European Semester are badly needed.
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Figure 4: Current account balance of the euro area (€ billions), 1999-2015
Source: AMECO database November 2015.
14. Page C272/99  of the
2015  Council Recommen-
dations on the implementa-
tion of the broad guidelines
for the economic policies of
the Member States whose
currency is  the euro.
15. Page 7 of the 2014
Commission Staff Working
Document accompanying
the Council Recommenda-
tions on the implementation
of the broad guidelines for
the economic policies of the
Member States whose
currency is the euro,
SWD(2014) 401 final.
16. “The recommendations
addressed to the euro area
in the context of the Euro-
pean Semester have already
proven their value in
fostering stronger policy
coordination in the euro
area. The increased owner-
ship of the euro area recom-
mendations by the
Eurogroup has facilitated
progress on a number of
important policy areas over
the last year. As a result, the
review of the draft budgetary
plans has led to firm
commitments taken by
Member States to adjust
their fiscal policies. The
Eurogroup has thoroughly
discussed reform plans and
fostered common under-
standing on important
issues such as the potential
benefits of structural
reforms, including those to
address high taxes on
labour, and the effects of
asymmetric economic
adjustment within EMU. This
has helped to find common
understanding on current
policy challenges, pinpoint
best practices and helped to
better coordinate policy
responses into directions
favourable to growth”
[emphasis added].
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4.1  On-going reforms
The European Commission has already “stream-
lined” the 2015 European Semester by further pri-
oritising and shortening the recommendations, by
publishing CSRs and euro-area recommendations
three months earlier than in previous years to
enable more discussion with various stakehold-
ers, and by aiming more intensive outreach. Thus
some of the proposals of Hallerberg, Marzinotto
and Wolff (2012a, 2012b) have been adopted. The
length of recommendations generally increased
between 2011-14, while there was a major cut-
back in 2015.
Recent proposals to revamp the European
Semester go in the right direction. According to the
Five Presidents’ Report, and a European Commis-
sion communication on 21 October 2015 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2015b), the European
Semester is to be split into two stages: first there
will be discussions and recommendations about
the euro area, and only then will CSRs be dis-
cussed and decided on, which should reflect the
common challenges identified in the first stage.
In our view, this is a welcome reform of the Euro-
pean Semester. 
On 21 October 2015, the Commission also issued
its decision on the establishment of an independ-
ent advisory European Fiscal Board (European
Commission, 2015c). This board will provide to the
Commission an evaluation of the implementation
of the fiscal framework, but it will also “advise the
Commission on the prospective fiscal stance
appropriate for the euro area as a whole”, and
“may advise the Commission on the appropriate
national fiscal stances that are  consistent with
its advice on the aggregate fiscal stance of the
euro area within the rules of the Stability and
Growth Pact”. This is a very welcome development
in our view and at least partly in line with the pro-
posal of Darvas and Vihriälä (2013), who sug-
gested the establishment of an independent fiscal
authority responsible for the definition and man-
agement of the euro area’s aggregate fiscal stance.
The Fiscal Board should promote a much-needed
discussion of the aggregate fiscal stance in the
first stage. It could also improve coordination by
pointing out which countries have fiscal space,
and should implement more expansionary fiscal
policy in order to bring the aggregate fiscal stance
to desired levels: this was an element that was
clearly missing in the CSRs, as we have pointed
out. 
However, according to the Commission’s 21
October 2015 proposal, the Fiscal Board can give
advice only within the SGP rules, so it will not be
free to define the optimality of the aggregate fiscal
stance. It will not have the power to manage the
fiscal stance and the European Commission will
not be obliged to incorporate the suggestions of
the Fiscal Board when deciding about euro-area
recommendations and CSRs. But even if the Fiscal
Board one day concludes that some countries
should have more expansionary fiscal policies,
and both the Commission and the Council endorse
that conclusion, there will not be many instru-
ments to enforce it. While countries can be
required to reduce their debts and deficits accord-
ing to the regulations of the Stability and Growth
Pact, there exists no mechanism by which
countries can be required to enact fiscal expan-
sion. This process could be supported by the use
of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure for
countries with too-large current account
surpluses, for example by requiring an increase in
public investment. While non-compliance with
such a recommendation could in principle lead to
sanctions under the current rules, even in the best
case, influencing countries via the MIP to increase
their public investment would take several years,
while the optimal fiscal stance should be achieved
promptly. Moreover, not all countries with fiscal
space have excessive current account surpluses.
In terms of the implementation of structural
reforms, the most promising proposal in our view
is the establishment of a euro-area system of
competitiveness authorities, composed of inde-
pendent national councils, a proposal made by
Sapir and Wolff (2015) and endorsed by the Five
Presidents’ Report. On 21 October 2015 the Euro-
pean Commission proposed a Council Recom-
mendation on the establishment of National
Competitiveness Boards within the euro area
(European Commission, 2015e). The national
councils would assess wage and productivity
developments and economic reforms to foster
competitiveness, while their European network
should help to exploit their synergies. 
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We see the establishment of national competi-
tiveness councils as a kind of decentralisation,
through which reform priorities would be defined
nationally. It will likely increase the ownership of
the reform process because a conclusion by such
a national council could be seen by the national
parliament and the government as a recommen-
dation coming from inside the country, but not as
an intrusion from Brussels. In our view, this is a
very welcome proposal. However, it needs to be
seen to what extent national councils would be
able to internalise the cross-border implications
of the reform process, and we are sceptical about
this. The proposed recommendation includes a
reference to euro-area considerations: “The Com-
mission should facilitate coordination between
national competitiveness boards and exchange
views with them, in particular to ensure the
consideration of euro-area and EU objectives in
the work of the boards.” While discussions and
information exchanges can foster mutual under-
standing of the cross-country spillover effects of
domestic policies, ultimate decisions remain
national. So far the MIP has been ineffective in
internalising cross-country spillover effects, partly
because of major disagreements about the signif-
icance of such affects, and therefore it remains to
be seen if the coordination of national competi-
tiveness boards would be able to achieve common
understanding leading to policy actions.
Nevertheless, the establishment of such compet-
itiveness boards would be a major improvement
compared to the current governance framework in
our view, even if the national boards primarily
focus on the domestic consequences of the
reform process. 
4.2  Further possible reforms
4.2.1 The aggregate fiscal stance
Political federations have central and sub-central
budgets. In a federation, fiscal stabilisation (which
has implications for the aggregate fiscal stance of
the federation) is mostly the job of the federal
government through automatic stabilisers and
discretionary fiscal decisions. The euro area is not
a political federation and does not have a central
budget. The EU has a budget, but its aim is not
fiscal stabilisation. We believe that a euro-area
fiscal stabilisation instrument would be more
helpful for aligning the aggregate fiscal stance
with the aggregate economic situation of the euro-
area (see, for example, Darvas, 2012; Wolff, 2012;
Pisani-Ferry, Vihriälä and Wolff, 2013) than coor-
dination of fiscal policies of member states. A fed-
eral stabilisation instrument could also let national
fiscal policies to follow national preferences when
fiscal rules are not binding. However, there are also
opposing views about the desirability of a (small)
euro-area budget or any other centralised fiscal
stabilisation instrument. Opponents argue that if
European fiscal rules are met, member states will
have sufficient room for manoeuvre for stabilising
their own economic cycles using their own fiscal
policies. In any case, the Five Presidents’ Report
incorporated a related proposal only for the long
term, so we do not expect a euro-area fiscal instru-
ment in the foreseeable future. 
Similarly, the prospect of a euro-area mechanism
that would force countries to have higher budget
deficits, as suggested by, for example, Sapir and
Wolff (2015), is extremely unlikely. As we high-
lighted earlier, even the modest attempt of the
European Commission to include in Germany’s
2015 CSR a clause to encourage the government
to use its fiscal space was deleted by the Council.
While parliaments and governments can change,
we see no political possibility of countries agree-
ing to a binding process that might force them to
have deficits that are larger than their domestic
preferences would deem appropriate.
In the absence of a euro-area fiscal stabilisation
instrument or a mechanism to force counties to
have larger budget deficits, the remaining options
to influence the aggregate fiscal stance are rather
limited. In any case, the European Fiscal Board
should be entrusted with the definition of an
unconstrained optimal aggregate fiscal stance (ie
the fiscal stance disregarding SGP rules) and its
constrained version which considers the SGP
rules. This exercise should be done for the euro
area as a whole and for each euro-area member
state. Such an exercise would help foster discus-
sions, but the problem will remain that there will
be no enforcement mechanism to require expan-
sionary fiscal policy. 
To sum up, we see it as extremely unlikely that
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any coordination mechanisms or the use of the
MIP would enable countries to be forced to have
larger deficits than their national preferences
would suggest. We are sceptical about whether
the optimal aggregate fiscal stance could be
achieved by anything other than pure chance. We
expect that vague statements will continue to be
made in the future about the aggregate fiscal
stance and the benefits of coordination.
4.2.2 The implementation of structural reforms
A number of proposals have been made on the
implementation of structural reforms. The IMF
(2015b) and Banerji et al (2015) suggested some
ways to enhance the implementation of structural
reforms. These include the definition of “outcome-
based” benchmarks, which are sufficiently con-
crete, measurable and directly under the control
of policymakers, and the use of EU legislation
where possible instead of coordination. Such
proposals were included in the Five Presidents’
Report for the medium term (“Stage 2”, which
should be completed by 2025). The proposal aims
to formalise and make more binding the conver-
gence process by “agreeing on a set of common
high-level standards that would be defined in EU
legislation, as sovereignty over policies of
common concern would be shared and strong
decision-making at euro area level would be
established”. While setting benchmarks may be
useful, Terzi (2015b) highlights that structural
reforms cannot be objectively measured. He
demonstrates that some of the indicators
proposed by Banerji et al (2015) show very sig-
nificant variations between the countries that are
at the top of the World Economic Forum World
Competitiveness Report rankings. We also see
difficulties in enforcement and making the system
binding if a country does not meet the standards
by the agreed time.
Some further proposals were also made by IMF
(2015b) and Banerji et al (2015) to strengthen
incentives, such as direct financial transfers from
the EU to cover reform costs and support imple-
mentation, a proposal that echoes the 2013-14
discussion on “contracts for competitiveness and
growth”. One key problem with such a contract, as
emphasised by Pisani-Ferry (2013), is that such a
grant in exchange for a particular reform would be
seen by domestic stakeholders as a bribe by which
European partners want to enforce a reform on the
country. The popularity of the government enter-
ing into such a contract might fall quickly. Even if
the reform proposal originally comes from the
country in question, domestic stakeholders might
perceive it as coming from European partners. 
There are other problems too. Such contracts or
any other financial incentives, such as a realloca-
tion of EU-sponsored investments to countries
that implement European Semester reform
suggestions, would reward countries that are slow
to implement reforms. Those countries that
followed the European Semester advice earlier
would not benefit from such a contract, while
providing retroactive contracts to reward those
countries that have already implemented reforms
would lead to a very messy system. Moreover,
financial incentives would not really matter for
larger countries with sound fiscal positions. For
example, we see it as inconceivable that Germany
would speed up services market reforms on the
basis that it would receive a few billion euros from
other euro-area countries. 
Banerji et al (2015) also suggest ex-post
monitoring of reform implementation by an
independent EU-level “structural council”. We find
this proposal worth consideration, not least
because independent evaluation could improve
transparency and could highlight the steps the
European Commission could take to improve the
cross-country consistency of CSRs.
In terms of increasing the domestic ownership of
the reform process, some proposals in the Five
Presidents’ Report and the 21 October 2015
Commission Communication on steps towards
completing economic and monetary union point
in the right direction. For example, Hallerberg,
Marzinotto and Wolff (2012a, 2012b) suggested
enhancing the role of national parliaments at the
EU level, enhancing the role of European institu-
tions at member-state level and increasing the
role of the European Parliament in the European
Semester. These suggestions are endorsed by the
Five Presidents’ Report. Similarly to the establish-
ment of national competitiveness councils, we
see the greater involvement of national
parliaments, governments and social partners in
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the discussion of the reform process as a means
of decentralisation, which can improve ownership
of the process.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The European Semester was enacted in 2011 with
the consent of all European Union member states
to foster economic policy coordination, to enforce
the overhauled Stability and Growth Pact and the
new macroeconomic imbalance rules, and to
achieve Europe 2020 targets. Despite the
unanimous will to create this new system of policy
coordination, our findings show that the European
Semester has been rather ineffective. This failure
highlights the fundamental problem of policy coor-
dination in the EU: national policymakers are
accountable to their national parliaments and
focus on national interests, which in many cases
differ widely in different member states. Unless
many member states face a common threat, such
as the existential threat to the euro in 2011-12,
coordination between national policymakers will
always have limitations. 
The question that naturally arises is if the Euro-
pean Semester is worth the effort, another policy
coordination system should be designed, or even
policy coordination should be scrapped. In our
view, given the cross-country implications of var-
ious national policies and the specific set-up of
the euro area, with centralised monetary policy
and banking oversight while most fiscal and eco-
nomic policies are decentralised, some form of
dialogue between member states is needed. The
European Semester has a legal basis based on
unanimity and we do not believe that any other
method of policy coordination is likely to work
much better, because of the fundamental problem
we have highlighted above. Therefore, efforts to
revamp the European Semester are welcome, but
expectations about possible achievements
should be realistic.
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ANNEx 1: COMPARISON OF 2014 EUROPEAN SEMESTER AND 2013 OECD RECOMMENDATIONS
Table 4 compares the 2014 European Semester CSRs and the 2013 OECD recommendations for the six
largest EU countries, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. OECD recommen-
dations are set every two years, so these two sets of recommendations are broadly comparable
(especially given the persistence through time of both CSRs and OECD recommendations). The table
shows that while there are a few similar recommendations by the OECD, there are still many differences
with the Country-Specific Recommendations made in the context of the European Semester. Also,
European Semester recommendations are usually much more detailed, and may contain many sub-rec-
ommendations. OECD recommendations typically do not. Thus, a single OECD recommendation might
echo part of a European Semester recommendation, but not its entirety. Therefore, while there exist
common recommendations given to each country in the context of the OECD Going for Growth and the
European Semester, these do not explain the finding that implementation rates are very similar for both
types of recommendations.
Table 4: 2014 European Semester vs 2013 OECD Going for Growth recommendations
France
European Semester Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations OECD Going for Growth Recommendations
Reinforce the budgetary strategy:
• Comply with the rules of the SGP
• Implement ambitious structural reforms to increase the adjustment
capacity and boost growth and employment
• Step up eﬀorts to achieve eﬃciency gains across all sub-sectors of
general government
• Reinforce incentives to streamline local government expenditure
• Take steps to tackle the increase in public expenditure on health
• Take additional measures when and where needed to bring the pen-
sion system into balance by 2020
No similar recommendation
• Ensure that the labour cost reduction resulting from the crédit d’im-
pôt compétitivité emploi is sustained
• Take action to further lower employer social security contributions
• Further evaluate the economic impact of social security contribution
exemptions and take appropriate measures if necessary
• Further reduce the cost of labour in a budget neutral way
No similar recommendation
• Simplify companies’ administrative, ﬁscal and accounting rules and
take concrete measures to implement the Government’s ongoing
"simpliﬁcation plan" by December 2014
• Eliminate regulatory impediments to companies’ growth
• Simplify and improve the eﬃciency of innovation policy
• Ensure that resources are focused on the most eﬀective competi-
tiveness poles and further promote the economic impact of innovation
developed in the poles.
No similar recommendation
• Remove unjustiﬁed restrictions on the access to and exercise of
regulated professions and reduce entry costs and promote competi-
tion in services
• Take further action to reduce the regulatory burden aﬀecting the
functioning of the retail sector
• Ensure that regulated gas and electricity tariﬀs for household cus-
tomers are set at an appropriate level which does not represent an
obstacle to competition
• Strengthen electricity and gas interconnection capacity with Spain
• In the railway sector, ensure the independence of the new uniﬁed
infrastructure manager from the incumbent operator and take steps to
open domestic passenger transport to competition
Reduce regulatory barriers to competition
Reduce the tax burden on labour and step up eﬀorts to simplify and
increase the eﬃciency of the tax system
Shift the tax burden away from labour, and con-
tinue to reduce the minimum cost of labour
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• Take further action to combat labour-market rigidity
• Take additional measures to reform the unemployment beneﬁt
system
• Ensure that older workers beneﬁt from adequate counselling and
training and re-assess the relevant speciﬁc unemployment beneﬁt
arrangements with respect to their situation on the labour market
Reform job protection and strengthen active
labour market policies
• Pursue the modernisation of vocational education and training,
implement the reform of compulsory education, and take further
actions to reduce educational inequalities in particular by
strengthening measures on early school leaving
• Ensure that active labour market policies eﬀectively support the
most vulnerable groups
• Improve the transition from school to work
Improve equity and outcomes in primary and sec-
ondary education
Improve the quality and eﬃciency of tertiary edu-
cation
Germany
European Semester Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations OECD Going for Growth Recommendations
Pursue growth-friendly ﬁscal policy and preserve a sound ﬁscal posi-
tion:
• Use available scope for increased public investment in
infrastructure, education and research
• Improve eﬃciency of tax system
• Increase cost-eﬀectiveness of public spending on health-care and
long-term care
• Ensure sustainability of public pension system
• Complete implementation of the debt brake consistently across all
Länder
No similar recommendation
Improve conditions that further support domestic demand:
• By reducing high taxes and social security contributions
• When implementing the general minimum wage, monitor its impact
on employment
• Improve employability of workers (through ALMPs and better educa-
tion)
• Reduce ﬁscal disincentives to work
• Facilitate transition from mini-jobs to forms of employment subject
to full mandatory social security contributions
• Address regional shortages in the availability of fulltime childcare
facilities and all-day schools while improving their overall educational
quality
Reduce tax wedges on labour income and shift
taxation towards less distortive sources.
Minimise costs of transforming the energy system No similar recommendation
• Stimulate competition in the services sector
• Identify reasons behind the low value of public contracts open to
procurement under EU legislation
• Remove unjustiﬁed planning regulations
• Remove remaining barriers to competition in railway markets
• Pursue consolidation eﬀorts in the Landesbanken sector
Reduce regulatory barriers to competition, espe-
cially in the services sector
No similar recommendation Improve tertiary education outcomes
No similar recommendation Ease job protection for regular workers
No similar recommendation
Remove obstacles to full-time female labour par-
ticipation
Italy
European Semester Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations OECD Going for Growth Recommendations
Reinforce the budgetary measures for 2014:
• Comply with the rules of the SGP
• Carry out the ambitious privatisation plan
• implement a growth-friendly ﬁscal adjustment while preserving
growth-enhancing spending like R&D, innovation, education and
essential infrastructure projects
No similar recommendation
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• Guarantee the independence and full operationalisation of the ﬁscal
council
• Further shift the tax burden from productive factors to consumption,
property and the environment
• Ensure more effective environmental taxation, including in the area
of excise duties, and remove environmentally harmful subsidies
• Implement the enabling law for tax reform by March 2015
• Further improve tax compliance by enhancing the predictability of
the tax system, simplifying procedures, improving tax debt recovery
and modernising tax administration
• Pursue the fight against tax evasion and take additional steps
against the shadow economy and undeclared work.
Improve the eﬃciency of the tax structure
• As part of a wider eﬀort to improve the eﬃciency of public
administration, clarify competences at all levels of Government
• Ensure better management of EU funds by taking decisive action to
improve administrative capacity, transparency, evaluation and quality
control
• Further enhance the eﬀectiveness of anti-corruption measures
• Monitor in a timely manner the impact of the reforms adopted to
increase the eﬃciency of civil justice
No similar recommendation
• Reinforce the resilience of the banking sector and ensure its
capacity to manage and dispose of impaired assets
• Foster non-bank access to ﬁnance for ﬁrms
• Continue to promote and monitor eﬃcient corporate governance
practices in the whole banking sector
No similar recommendation
• Evaluate, by the end of 2014, the impact of the labour market and
wage-setting reforms on job creation, dismissals’ procedures, labour
market duality and cost competitiveness
• Work towards a more comprehensive social protection for the
unemployed
• Strengthen the link between active and passive labour market
policies
• Adopt eﬀective action to promote female employment
• Provide adequate services across the country to non-registered
young people and ensure stronger private sector commitment to
oﬀering quality apprenticeships and traineeships by the end of 2014
• Scale-up the new pilot social assistance scheme, in compliance with
budgetary targets
• Improve the eﬀectiveness of family support schemes and quality
services favouring low-income households with children.
Enhance active labour market policies
• Implement the National System for Evaluation of Schools to improve
school outcomes in turn and reduce rates of early school leaving
• Increase the use of work-based learning in upper secondary
vocational education and training and strengthen
vocationally-oriented tertiary education
• Create a national register of qualiﬁcations to ensure wide recognition
of skills.
• Ensure that public funding better rewards the quality of higher edu-
cation and research. 
Improve equity and eﬃciency in education
• Approve the pending legislation or other equivalent measures aimed
at simplifying the regulatory environment for businesses and citizens
• Foster market opening and remove remaining barriers to, and
restrictions on, competition in the professional and local public serv-
ices, insurance, fuel distribution, retail and postal services sectors
• Enhance the eﬃciency of public procurement
• In local public services, rigorously implement the legislation provid-
ing for the rectiﬁcation of contracts that do not comply with the
requirements on in-house awards by 31 December 2014.
Reduce barriers to competition
• Ensure swift and full operationalisation of the Transport Authority by
September 2014. 
No similar recommendation
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• Approve the list of strategic infrastructure in the energy sector and
enhance port management and connections with the hinterland.
No similar recommendation
Pursue rebalancing of protection from jobs to
workers’ income
Poland
European Semester Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations OECD Going for Growth Recommendations
Reinforce the budgetary strategy:
• Comply with the rules of the SGP
• Implement ambitious structural reforms to increase the adjustment
capacity and boost growth and employment
• Minimise cuts in growth-enhancing investment, improve the target-
ing of social policies and the cost eﬀectiveness of spending and the
overall eﬃciency of the healthcare sector, broaden the tax base for
example by addressing the issue of an extensive system of reduced
VAT rates, and improve tax compliance, in particular by increasing the
eﬃciency of the tax administration
• Establish an independent ﬁscal council.
No similar recommendation
• Strengthen eﬀorts to reduce youth unemployment in line with the
objectives of a youth guarantee
• Increase adult participation in lifelong learning
• Combat labour market segmentation
• Continue eﬀorts to increase female labour market participation
• Include farmers in the general pension system
• Phase out the special pension system for miners
• Underpin the general pension reform by stepping up eﬀorts to pro-
mote the employability of older workers to raise exit ages from the
labour market
No similar recommendation
Improve the eﬀectiveness of tax incentives in promoting R&D in the
private sector as part of the eﬀorts to strengthen the links between
research, innovation and industrial policy, and better target existing
instruments at the diﬀerent stages of the innovation cycle.
No similar recommendation
• Renew and extend energy generation capacity and improve eﬃ-
ciency in the whole energy chain
• Speed up and extend the development of the electricity grid
• Ensure eﬀective implementation of railway investment projects
• Accelerate eﬀorts to increase ﬁxed broadband coverage
• Improve waste management
No similar recommendation
• Take further steps to improve the business environment by simplify-
ing contract enforcement and requirements for construction permits. 
• Step up eﬀorts to reduce costs and time spent on tax compliance by
businesses. 
• Complete the ongoing reform aimed at facilitating access to regu-
lated professions.
Upgrade transport, communication and energy
infrastructure
No similar recommendation
Reduce public ownership and lower barriers to
product market competition
No similar recommendation
Reduce labour taxes and reform the welfare
system
No similar recommendation
Improve equity and eﬃciency of the education
system
No similar recommendation Reform housing policies
Spain
European Semester Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations OECD Going for Growth Recommendations
Reinforce the budgetary strategy:
• Comply with the rules of the SGP
• Implement ambitious structural reforms to increase the adjustment
capacity and boost growth and employment
• Ensure that the new independent ﬁscal authority becomes fully operational
No similar recommendation
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• Ensure a full implementation of the preventive, corrective and
enforcement measures in the Budgetary Stability Organic Law at all
levels of government
• Carry out by February 2015 a systematic review of expenditure at all
levels of government
• Continue to increase the cost-eﬀectiveness of the healthcare sector
• Adopt by the end of 2014 a comprehensive tax reform
• Step up the ﬁght against tax evasion
No similar recommendation
• Complete reform of the saving banks sector
• Promote banks’ efforts to sustain strong capital ratios
• Monitor the asset management company Sareb’s activity in order to
ensure timely asset disposal while minimising the cost to the tax-
payer
• Complete the ongoing measures to widen SMEs access to finance
• Remove remaining bottlenecks in the corporate insolvency frame-
work
• Develop a permanent framework for personal insolvency
No similar recommendation
• Reduce labour market segmentation
• Continue regular monitoring of the labour market reforms
• Strengthen the job-search requirement in unemployment beneﬁts
• Enhance the eﬀectiveness and targeting of active labour market
policies
• Accelerate the modernisation of public employment services
• Ensure the eﬀective application of public-private cooperation in
placement services before the end of 2014
• Ensure the eﬀective functioning of the Single Job Portal and com-
bine it with further measures to support labour mobility
Improve active labour market policies
Reduce the gap in job protection between tempo-
rary and permanent contracts
• Implement the 2013-2016 Youth Entrepreneurship and Employ-
ment Strategy and evaluate its eﬀectiveness
• Provide good quality oﬀers of employment, apprenticeships and
traineeships for young people
• Increase the quality of primary and secondary education
• Enhance guidance and support for groups at risk of early school
leaving
• Increase the labour-market relevance of vocational education and
training and of higher education
Improve educational attainment in secondary
education and access to tertiary education
• Implement the 2013-2016 National Action Plan on Social Inclusion
• Strengthen administrative capacity and coordination between
employment and social services
• Improve the targeting of family support schemes and quality serv-
ices favouring low-income households with children
No similar recommendation
• Ensure an ambitious and swift implementation of Law No 20/2013
on Market Unity at all levels of administration
• Adopt an ambitious reform of professional services and of profes-
sional associations by the end of 2014
• Further reduce the time, cost and number of procedures required for
setting up an operating business
• Identify sources of ﬁnancing for the new national strategy for sci-
ence, technology and innovation and make operational the new State
Research Agency.
Lower entry barriers in services industries
• Following the reform of 2013, ensure the eﬀective elimination of
deﬁcit in the electricity system as of 2014
• Address the problem of insolvent toll motorways
• Set up an independent body to contribute to the assessment of
future major infrastructure projects by the end of 2014
• Take measures to ensure eﬀective competition in freight and pas-
senger rail services
No similar recommendation
• Implement at all government levels the recommendations of the
committee for the reform of the public administration
• Strengthen control mechanisms and increase the transparency of
No similar recommendation
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administrative decisions
• Complete and monitor closely the ongoing measures to ﬁght against
the shadow economy and undeclared work
• Adopt pending reforms on the structure of the judiciary and on the
judicial map
No similar recommendation
Make wages more responsive to economic and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc conditions
No similar recommendation
Reduce the disincentives for older workers to con-
tinue working
United Kingdom
European Semester Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations OECD Going for Growth Recommendations
Reinforce the budgetary strategy
• Comply with the rules of the SGP
• Consideration should be given to raising revenues through broaden-
ing the tax base
• Address structural bottlenecks related to infrastructure, skills mis-
matches and access to ﬁnance for SMEs.
No similar recommendation
• Increase the transparency of the use and impact of macro-pruden-
tial regulation in respect of the housing sector by the Bank of Eng-
land’s Financial Policy Committee
• Deploy appropriate measures to respond to the rapid increases in
property prices in areas that account for a substantial share of
economic growth in the United Kingdom, particularly London, and miti-
gate risks related to high mortgage indebtedness
• Monitor the Help to Buy 2 scheme and adjust it if deemed necessary
• Consider reforms to the taxation of land and property
• Continue eﬀorts to increase the supply of housing.
No similar recommendation
• Maintain commitment to the Youth Contract
• Ensure employer engagement by placing emphasis on addressing
skills mismatches
• Reduce the number of young people with low basic skills.
No similar recommendation
• Continue eﬀorts to reduce child poverty in low-income households
• Improve the availability of aﬀordable quality childcare.
Strengthen work incentives by reforming welfare
and childcare policies
• Continue eﬀorts to improve the availability of bank and non-bank
ﬁnancing to SMEs. 
• Ensure the eﬀective functioning of the Business Bank and support
an increased presence of challenger banks.
No similar recommendation
• Follow up on the National Infrastructure Plan by increasing the pre-
dictability of the planning processes as well as providing clarity on
funding commitments. 
• Ensure transparency and accountability by providing consistent and
timely information on the implementation of the Plan.
No similar recommendation
No similar recommendation Improve outcomes and equity in education
No similar recommendation
Improve public infrastructure, especially for trans-
port
No similar recommendation Strengthen public sector eﬃciency
No similar recommendation Reform planning regulation
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Table 5: The 2015 recommendations for the euro-area and the ﬁve largest euro-area Member States
Euro area
1. Use peer pressure to promote structural reforms that facilitate the correction of large internal and
external debts and support investment. Regularly assess the delivery of reforms in those Member
States which require specific monitoring within the framework of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Proce-
dure. Continue the regular thematic assessment of structural reforms. By spring 2016, take decisions
on the follow-up to the coordination exercise on reducing the high tax wedge on labour and on reforming
services markets.
2. Coordinate fiscal policies to ensure that the aggregate euro area fiscal stance is in line with sustain-
ability risks and cyclical conditions. This is without prejudice to the fulfilment of the requirements of
the Stability and Growth Pact. By spring 2016, hold thematic discussions on improvements in the qual-
ity and sustainability of public finances, focussing in particular on the prioritisation of tangible and
intangible investment at national and EU levels, and on making tax systems more growth friendly. Mon-
itor the effective functioning of the recently strengthened national fiscal frameworks.
3. Ensure the timely finalisation of the follow up of the Comprehensive Assessment carried out by the
European Central Bank, implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council (1) (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive), completion of the ratification of the Intergovern-
mental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund and make the Fund fully operational as from January
2016. Promote measures to deepen market-based finance, to improve access to finance for SMEs and
to develop alternative sources of finance. Encourage further reforms of national insolvency frame-
works.
4. Take forward work on deepening Economic and Monetary Union, and contribute to the improvement
of the economic surveillance framework in the context of the report on the next steps on better eco-
nomic governance in the euro area, prepared by the President of the European Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker, in close cooperation with the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the
President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, the President of the European Central Bank, Mario
Draghi, and the President of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, and its follow-up.
France
1. Ensure effective action under the excessive deficit procedure and a durable correction of the exces-
sive deficit by 2017 by reinforcing the budgetary strategy, taking the necessary measures for all years
and using all windfall gains for deficit and debt reduction. Specify the expenditure cuts planned for
these years and provide an independent evaluation of the impact of key measures.
2. Step up efforts to make the spending review effective, continue public policy evaluations and identify
savings opportunities across all sub-sectors of general government, including on social security and
local government. Take steps to limit the rise in local authorities’ administrative expenditure. Take addi-
tional measures to bring the pension system into balance, in particular ensuring by March 2016 that
the financial situation of complementary pension schemes is sustainable over the long term.
3. Ensure that the labour cost reductions stemming from the tax credit for competitiveness and
employment and from the responsibility and solidarity pact are sustained, in particular by implement-
ing them as planned in 2016. Evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes in the light of labour and
product market rigidities. Reform in consultation with the social partners and in accordance with
national practices, the wage-setting process to ensure that wages evolve in line with productivity.
Ensure that minimum wage developments are consistent with the objectives of promoting employment
and competitiveness.
4. By the end of 2015, reduce regulatory impediments to companies’ growth, in particular by reviewing
the size-related criteria in regulations to avoid threshold effects. Remove the restrictions on access to
and the exercise of regulated professions, beyond the legal professions, in particular as regards the
health professions as from 2015.
5. Simplify and improve the efficiency of the tax system, in particular by removing inefficient tax expen-
diture. To promote investment, take action to reduce the taxes on production and the corporate income
statutory rate, while broadening the tax base on consumption. Take measures as from 2015 to abolish
inefficient taxes that are yielding little or no revenue.
ANNEx 2: EUROPEAN SEMESTER 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS.
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6. Reform the labour law to provide more incentives for employers to hire on open-ended contracts.
Facilitate take up of derogations at company and branch level from general legal provisions, in particu-
lar as regards working time arrangements. Reform the law creating the accords de maintien de l’emploi
by the end of 2015 in order to increase their take-up by companies. Take action in consultation with the
social partners and in accordance with national practices to reform the unemployment benefit system
in order to bring the system back to budgetary sustainability and provide more incentives to return to
work.
Germany
1. Further increase public investment in infrastructure, education and research. To foster private invest-
ment, take measures to improve the efficiency of the tax system, in particular by reviewing the local
trade tax and corporate taxation and by modernising the tax administration. Use the ongoing review to
improve the design of fiscal relations between the federation, Länder and municipalities, particularly
with a view to ensuring adequate public investment at all levels of government.
2. Increase incentives for later retirement. Take measures to reduce high labour taxes and social secu-
rity contributions, especially for low-wage earners, and address the impact of fiscal drag. Revise the
fiscal treatment of mini-jobs to facilitate the transition to other forms of employment.
3. Take more ambitious measures to stimulate competition in the services sector, in particular in pro-
fessional services, by eliminating unjustified restrictions such as legal form and shareholding require-
ments and fixed tariffs. To this end, conclude the ongoing domestic review of these barriers and take
follow-up measures. Remove the remaining barriers to competition in the railway markets, in particular
in long-distance rail passenger transport.
Italy
1. Achieve a fiscal adjustment of at least 0,25 % of GDP towards the medium-term budgetary objective
in 2015 and of 0,1 % of GDP in 2016 by taking the necessary structural measures in both 2015 and
2016, taking into account the allowed deviation for the implementation of major structural reforms.
Ensure that the spending review is an integral part of the budgetary process. Swiftly and thoroughly
implement the privatisation programme and use windfall gains to make further progress towards put-
ting the general government debt ratio on an appropriate downward path. Implement the enabling law
for tax reform by September 2015, in particular the revision of tax expenditures and cadastral values
and the measures to enhance tax compliance.
2. Adopt the planned national strategic plan for ports and logistics, particularly to help promote inter-
modal transport through better connections. Ensure that the Agency for Territorial Cohesion is made
fully operational so that the management of EU funds markedly improves.
3. Adopt and implement the pending laws aimed at improving the institutional framework and mod-
ernising the public administration. Revise the statute of limitations by mid-2015. Ensure that the
reforms adopted to improve the efficiency of civil justice help reduce the length of proceedings.
4. By end-2015, introduce binding measures to tackle remaining weaknesses in the corporate gover-
nance of banks, implement the agreed reform of foundations, and take measures to accelerate the
broad-based reduction of non-performing loans.
5. Adopt the legislative decrees on the design and use of wage supplementation schemes, the revision
of contractual arrangements, work-life balance and the strengthening of active labour market policies.
Promote, in consultation with the social partners and in accordance with national practices, an effec-
tive framework for second-level contractual bargaining. As part of efforts to tackle youth unemploy-
ment, adopt and implement the planned school reform and expand vocationally-oriented tertiary
education.
6. Implement the simplification agenda for 2015-17 to ease the administrative and regulatory burden.
Adopt competition-enhancing measures in all the sectors covered by the competition law, and take
decisive action to remove remaining barriers. Ensure that local public services contracts not complying
with the requirements on in-house awards are rectified by no later than end-2015.
Netherlands
1. Shift public expenditure towards supporting investment in R&D and work on framework conditions
for improving private R&D expenditure in order to counter the declining trend in public R&D expenditure
and increase the potential for economic growth.
2. With the strengthening of the recovery, accelerate the decrease in mortgage interest tax deductibility
so that tax incentives to invest in unproductive assets are reduced. Provide for a more market-oriented-
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pricing mechanism in the rental market and further relate rents to household income in the social hous-
ing sector.
3. Reduce the level of contributions to the second pillar of the pension system for those in the early
years of working life.
Spain
1. Ensure a durable correction of the excessive deficit by 2016 by taking the necessary structural
measures in 2015 and 2016 and using windfall gains to accelerate the deficit and debt reduction.
Strengthen transparency and accountability of regional public finances. Improve the cost-effectiveness
of the healthcare sector, and rationalise hospital pharmaceutical spending.
2. Complete the reform of the savings bank sector, including by means of legislative measures, and
complete the restructuring and privatisation of state-owned savings banks.
3. Promote the alignment of wages and productivity, in consultation with the social partners and in
accordance with national practices, taking into account differences in skills and local labour market
conditions as well as divergences in economic performance across regions, sectors and companies.
Take steps to increase the quality and effectiveness of job search assistance and counselling, includ-
ing as part of tackling youth unemployment. Streamline minimum income and family support schemes
and foster regional mobility.
4. Remove the barriers preventing businesses from growing, including barriers arising from size-contin-
gent regulations; adopt the planned reform on professional services; accelerate the implementation of
the law on market unity.
